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RISKY PREGNANCY: LIABILITY, BLAME, AND INSURANCE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF PRENATAL HARM
ROXANNE MYKITIUK & DAYNA NADINE SCOTT,

I.

INTRODUCTION
Feminist theory has exposed the body of the pregnant woman as one that is
continuously made into the object of analysis and regulation,1 and feminist
scholars have sought to understand the evolving contestation over the
boundary between the woman and the fetus: the life sometimes conceptualized as part of her and other times as carried with her.' Together, they are
"not-one-but-not-two".I "Always marked by race, class and ability" asJohnson
notes, "the pregnant body is sometimes celebrated, sometimes reviled",' and,
as we will argue, always judged.
As historian Barbara Duden has shown, the state of "expecting a baby"
has been transformed in recent years from one of "being in good hope"' to

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
See Rebecca Johnson, "Blurred Boundaries: A Double-Voiced Dialogue on Regulatory
2

Regimes and Embodied Space" (2005) 9 Law Text Culture 157 at 157.
See ibid at 157-58; Adrienne Cecile Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience
andInstitution (New York: Norton, 1976); Jenny Morgan,"Foetal Imaginings: Searching
for a Vocabulary in the Law and Politics of Reproduction" (2000) 12 CJWL 371.

3

Isabel Karpin, "Legislating the Female Body: Reproductive Technology and the Reconstructed Woman" (1992) 3 ColumJ Gender & L 325 at 329.

4

Johnson, supra note 1 at 158.
Silja Samerski, "The 'Decision-Trap': How Genetic Counseling Transforms Pregnant
Women into Managers of Foetal Risk Profles" in Kelly Hannah-Moffat & Pat O'Malley,
eds, GenderedRisks (New York: Routledge- Cavendish, 2007) 55 at 59.
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one of being in a state of bad expectation.6 Pregnancy is increasingly conceptualized as a risky state' and the pregnant body is exposed as a site of risk governance and management wherein the principle aim is to protect the health
of the developing fetus and to protect it from harm. Risk governance and
management strategies aimed at protecting the fetus are carried out through
a number of practices (e.g. surveillance and discipline) and a number of discourses (including medical, cultural, and legal) which we document and analyze throughout this article.
This article has four parts. In Part II, we situate techniques of risk governance within the current governmentalityliterature and examine them as oart
of a neo-liberal political project that has the effect of "individualizing" risk.
In Part III, we explore how contemporary medical, public health, and popular-cultural discourses operate as techniques of risk governance "through
which individuals are brought to work on themselves'? and demonstrate how
these are extremely successful at accomplishing the translation between risk
and blame in the context of pregnancy. In Part IV, we examine situations
where pregnant women have refused to govern themselves in expected ways,
in line with protecting the health of the fetus. In this context, we examine the
current legal regime in Canada through which maternal responsibility for
fetal exposure to the risk of harm and maternal liability for harm to the fetus
and child once born, resulting from "risky" behaviours in pregnancy, are established and assessed. As we demonstrate, the most recent Canadian jurisprudence of the highest-level courts appears as a site of resistance in the trend
towards translation from risk to blame in the context of the governance of
maternal behaviour during pregnancy.
Finally, in Part V, we consider Albertas Maternal Tort Liability Act,'
which provides an exception to the common law by granting a civil cause of
action to a child who sustains prenatal injuries as a result of the negligent use
6

BarbaraDuden,Disembodying Women: Perspectiveson Pregnancyand the Unborn (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993).

7

See generally Lorna Weir, Pregancy,Risk and Biopolitics: On the Threshold ofthe Living
Subject (Oxford: Routledge, 2006) [Weir (2006)].
Paul Rabinow & Nikolas Rose, "Biopower Today" (2006) 1 BioSocieties 195 at 197.
SA 2005, c M-7.5 [MTLA].
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or operation of a motor vehicle by the child's mother during her pregnancy
(but limits that liability to circumstances in which the child's mother has
motor vehicle insurance). Here, and in the final section, we explore the connections between liability and insurance raised by the Alberta example, and
the extent to which they challenge the conclusion that linking risk with
blame is necessarily an individualizing move. In the end, however, we note
that liability inevitably comes with blame.
We attempt in this article to take up a scholarly task articulated by Hannah-Moffat and O'Malley: to pay attention to the processes through which
risk governance techniques "create gendered subjectivities and to how risk
regimes produce inequalities, undermine gains and reconfigure social and
individual problems."o In addition, this case study invites a further consideration of the role of law in neo-liberal governance, especially in light of the
widespread refusal by courts to interpret and apply common law doctrines
that would assign blame for harm where women have undertaken allegedly
risky behaviours during pregnancy, and in light of the legislative development
in Alberta in circumstances involving motor vehicle insurance.

II. CONSTRUCTIONS OF RISK AND RISK-BASED
GOVERNANCE
There is a growing body of scholarship that treats "risk" as a technique of law
and governance." Governing with risk is seen as a means of channelling institutional practices and systems into a pattern that begins with assessmentand

1o

Kelly Hannah-Moffat & Pat O'Malley, "Gendered Risks: An Introduction" in HannahMoffat & O'Malley, supra note 5, 1 at 25.
See e.g. Pat O'Malley, "The Government of Risks" in Austin Sarat, ed, The Blackwell
Companion toLawandSociety(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) 292; Nikolas Rose, "Governing
'Advanced' Liberal Democracies" in Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne & Nikolas S Rose,
eds, FoucaultandPoliticalReason:Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalitiesof Government (London: UCL Press, 1996) 37;Jessica Polzer & Ann Robertson, "From Familial
Disease to'Genetic Risk': Harnessing Women's Labour in the (Co)Production of Scientific Knowledge about Breast Cancer" in Hannah-Moffat & O'Malley,supranote 5, 31.
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moves throughprediction to management." The effect is argued to transform
the pervasive uncertainties and indeterminacies generated by the interaction
of complex social and biological systems into calculable probabilities ofharm
subject to management. The technique of risk governance is often viewed as
a mechanism for making people more individually accountable for risk, and
concomitantly, the technique is often tied directly to a neo-liberal political
project."

Socio-legal scholars have noted in recent years an increasing tendency of
actors to both conceive of and address problems in the language of risk.' At
the same time, they acknowledge a "change in the way risk is articulated and
deployed."'" However, many of these socio-legal scholars working in a mode
of "governmentality"17 reject the premise that risk-based government is a new
12

13

Nikolas Rose, "Governing Risky Individuals: The Role of Psychiatry in New Regimes of
Control" (1998) 5 Psychiatry, Psychology & Law 177.
Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, eds, EmbracingRisk: The ChangingCulture oflnsurance
and Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) at 178.

14

See e.g. O'Malleysupranote 11; Roxanne Mykitiuk, "Public Bodies, Private Parts: Genetics in a Post-Keynesian Era" in Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds, Privatization,Law
and the Challengeto Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 311; Mary
Condon, "Gendered Risks of Retirement: The Legal Governance of Defined Contribution Pensions in Canada" in Hannah-Moffat & O'Malley, supra note 5, 145; Deborah
Lupton, Risk (New York: Routledge, 1999); Deborah Lupton, "Introduction: Risk and
Sociocultural Theory" in Deborah Lupton, ed, Risk and SocioculturalTheory: New DirectionsandPerspectives(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 1; Richard V Ericson & Kevin D Haggerty, PolicingtheRiskin Society (New York: Oxford University Press,
1997). The neo-liberal political project is a widespread, international political project
aimed at restoring the power of economic elites. Generally, it has been tied to reforms
seeking the protection of private property rights, and the promotion of free markets and
free trade, and attempts at deregulating business and privatizing government assets and
services. See generally David HarveyA BriefHistoryofNeoliberalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005).

I

O'Malley,supra note 11.

16

Baker & Simon, supra note 13 at 20.

1

Foucault coined the term "governmentality" to refer to the techniques and justifications
through which "government"-in the sense of the whole array of programs, practices,
policies and procedures by which both state and non-state actors seek to control the con-
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technique and that risk consciousness is universally growing in response to
scientific and technological advances. Instead, they argue that "risk is a variable technique of government", and that we, in recent history, are witnessing
the replacement of the "social" or "collective" forms of risk governance that
dominated in the welfare era with "individualizing" forms."8 What is new
about contemporary risk governance techniques is "the sense that ordinary
people should exhibit some sort of responsibility for, and even expertise in
managing, risk."
According to the governmentality school, current forms of risk governance tend to create "an obligation to act in the present in relation to the potential futures that now come into view."20 As Nikolas Rose explains,
By recognizing the impossibility of certainty about the future, [risk thinking] simultaneously makes this lack of certainty quantifiable in terms of
probability. And once it has quantified the probability of a future event's
occurring, decisions can be made and justified about what to do in the present ....

21

The notion of "the future" as something amenable to alteration informs the
conception of risk as a means of calculating and managing the uncertainties
of the future. 22 It is "a switch from a reactive to an active orientation toward
uncertainty".23
duct of individuals and organizations-is effectuated. See Michel Foucault, "Governmentality" in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller, eds, The FoucaultEffect (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 87 at 103.
'8

O'Malley, supra note 11 at 301.

19

Hannah-Moffat & O'Malley, supranote 10 at 2.

20

Carlos Novas & Nikolas Rose, "Genetic Risk and the Birth of the Somatic Individual"

2
22

(2000) 29 Economy & Society 485 at 486.
Nikolas Rose, "At Risk of Madness" in Baker & Simon, supra note 13, 209 at 214.
Gerda Reith, "Uncertain Times: The Notion of 'Risk' and the Development of Modernity" (2004) 13 Time & Society 383 at 384. As Mary Douglas states,"risk analysis is concerned with trying to turn uncertainties into probabilities." RiskAcceptabilityAccordingto
the Social Sciences (Russell Sage Foundation, 1985) at 42.

23

Thomas Lemke, "Disposition and Determinism-Genetic Diagnostics in Risk Society"
(2004) 52 Sociological Review 550 at 552.
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This focus on calculation means that risk governance is often portrayed
as "amoral."I' Risks are held up as simple "realities:' and any behaviour that
denies, ignores, or resists them can be safely dismissed as "irrational."25 However, "while the discourses and practices of risk-based government" are
claimed to be "technical and thus neutral," others contend they must be
treated as "thoroughly imbued with politics." 6 At the same time, those politics are not always obvious. 27 There is a heterogeneity to risk-based techniques:28 "they can operate differently in different contexts".2 1
Contemporary risk-based governance also tends to focus on individual
"empowerment"-the "attitudinal and knowledgeable reformation of individuals" through risk communication techniques so that individuals may
make "informed decisions" about risk."o Consistent with a core idea of governing in contemporary liberal-democratic states that individuals should be
free to control themselves and govern their own lives, the governance of individual subjects aims to promote processes of self-regulation and create the
circumstances under which people may effectively govern themselves.'
"When law aligns with liberal governance," as Weir notes, "it secures citizens
as autonomous subjects with civil rights and freedoms guaranteed by the de-

24

O'Malley,supra note 11 at 294.

25

Ibid.

26

Dayna Nadine Scott, "Risk as a Technique of Governance in an Era of Biotechnological
Innovation" in Law Commission of Canada, ed, Risk and Trust: Includingor Excluding
Citizens? (Black Point: Fernwood, 2007) 23 at 26 [Scott (2007)]. Cf Mariana Valverde,
Ron Levi & Dawn Moore, "Legal Knowledges of Risk" in Law Commission of Canada,
ed, Law and Risk (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 86.

27

See Scott (2007), supra note 26 at 26.

28

Lorna Weir, "Recent Developments in the Governance of Pregnancy" (1996) 25 Economy & Society 372 at 379 [Weir (1996)].

29

Scott (2007), supra note 26 at 26.

30

O'Malley,supra note 11 at 302. See also Kevin Haggerty, "From Risk to Precaution: The
Rationalities of Personal Crime Prevention" in Richard V Ericson & Aaron Doyle, eds,
Risk andMorality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 193.

'3

Mykitiuk, supra note 14 at 312.

2011

RISKY PREGNANCY

317

mocratic sovereign."3 This autonomous, self-regulating subject exercises his
or her choices informed by expert knowledge, voluntarily seeking to maximize its opportunities and minimize its risks, allowing the state, optimally, to
govern from a distance.
It is easy to see how this change is thought to introduce "new moralities
of responsibility and accountability at multiple levels of society."33 Most important for this article is Mary Douglas' demonstration of the way in which
the apparently "neutral" risk discourse carries undercurrents of blame and
responsibility. 4 In Douglas' cultural approach to risk," [w]hatever objective
dangers may exist in the world, social organizations will emphasize those that
reinforce the moral, political or religious order that holds the group together."35 Thus even where the constructions of "risky" behaviour are framed
as being objective and thus morally neutral, they necessarily work to define
the parameters of morality and blameworthiness.
Several writers have demonstrated that risk has become a central concept
"around which health in Western society is described, organized, and practised, both personally and professionally."36 In the clinical context, risk is determined based on the characteristics of individuals, while in the epidemiological context, it is determined by observing patterns of disease in popula-

32

Weir (2006), supra note 7 at 14.

3

Richard V Ericson & Aaron Doyle, "Risk and Morality" in Ericson & Doyle, supra note
30, 1 at 4 .

34

See Mary Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (New York: Routledge,
1992) at 11.

3

Steve Rayner, "Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis" in Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic
Golding, eds, Social Theories ofRisk (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1992) 83 at 87 (summarizing Douglas' approach).

36

Ann Robertson, "Embodying Risk, Embodying Political Rationality: Women's Accounts
of Risks for Breast Cancer" (2000) 2 Health, Risk & Society 219 at 229. See also Deborah Lupton, "Risk as Moral Danger: the Social and Political Functions ofRisk Discourse
in Public Health" (1993) 23 Int'lJ Health Serv 425 [Lupton (1993)]; Alan Petersen,
"Public Health, the New Genetics and Subjectivity" in Alan Petersen et al, eds, Poststructuralism, Citizenship and Social Policy (London: Routledge, 1999) 114.
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tions, and by identifying associated risk factors." However, as Lupton notes,
both approaches render risks as "calculable and governable, thus bringing
them into being as problems that require action."
Through these techniques, pregnant women are being advised about,
trained in, and made responsible for the management of risks. 9 They are
assigned to "risk categories:' rather than treated as unique cases. Indeed, risk
techniques were attached to pregnancy and childbirth as early as the 1950s
with the intent of reducing perinatal mortality and morbidity: "whatever
arguments are made about apparent moral neutrality, the value implications
here are frequently near the surface, as with the moral (and sometimes legal)
governance of those pregnant women deemed to expose their fetuses to
risks."40 In fact, Deborah Lupton counsels us to pay attention to the political
purposes to which risk discourse is put. The normative message is that it is
the responsibility of the individual to avoid health risks, not just for our own
safety, but for that of society.'
A consequence of this technique of governance is that the focus is placed
on judging women's behaviours rather than their intentions or motivations.
"Ironically, while government can appear morally neutral in this process, the
individual's failure to govern risks becomes morally reprehensible or irrational."43 An outcome or event that may once have been viewed as "bad
luck"-based on chance alone-is transformed into an event that is predictable and thus governable. 4 The modern use of risk has, as Lupton explains, a
"'forensic' property"; it "works backwards in explaining ill-fortune, as well as

3

See Deborah Lupton, "Risk and the Ontology of Pregnant Embodiment" in Lupton, Risk
and SocioculturalTheory, supra note 14, 59 at 63 [Lupton (1999)].

38

Ibid.

3

See generally Weir (2006), supra note 7.

40

O'Malley,supranote 11 at 295.

4'

Lupton (1993), supra note 36 at 429.

42

O'Malley,supra note 11 at 293.

43

Ibid at 295.

4

Samerski, supra note 5.
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forwards in predicting future retribution."4 5 The fact of harm to the fetusthe absence of the "normal, healthy" state-is given as evidence that the expectant mother failed to comply with the relevant directives to reduce risk,
and therefore can comfortably be assigned blame." The question of how
these risks become individualized and successfully transferred to the expectant mother is taken up in the next section.

III. GOVERNING PREGNANCY
How do risky behaviours in pregnancy translate into the assignment ofblame
and responsibility to mothers? We argue that this occurs by both informal
and formal means. Lealle Ruhl has examined how the process of riskresponsibilization works in pregnancy to create risk-conscious women. 7 As
she demonstrates, risk techniques have been instrumental in shifting focus
from the woman to the fetus, and in placing responsibility on the woman to
become knowledgeable and competent to manage the risks to her future
baby. The pregnant woman is now expected to actively engage in various
gendered practices of risk detection and regulation.
A.

SLIPPAGE AND EASY TRANSLATION: MEDICAL AND POPULAR
DISCOURSES

Risk discourses, both medical and popular, fuel an insidious encroachment
into pregnant women's lives through the informal governance of their "lifestyle" choices, health behaviours, and decisions about prenatal care. Nowhere
in medicine, claims Samerski, has risk-thinking been so powerful (and so
seemingly effective) as in prenatal care." This is certainly a phenomenon
mediated by class considerations, as working-class women are less able to
conform or to appear to conform to the high standards of behaviour ex-

45

46

47

Lupton (1993), supranote 36 at 430, citing Mary Douglas, "Risk as a Forensic Resource"
(1990) 119:4 Daedalus 1.
Lupton (1993), supra note 36 at 430.
See Lealle Ruhl, "Liberal Governance and Prenatal Care: Risk and Regulation in Pregnancy" (1999) 28 Economy & Society 95.

41

Samerski, supra note 5.

320

U.B.C. LAW REVIEW

VOL. 43:2

pected of a potential mother." For example, women who smoke or drink
alcohol during pregnancy are subject to intense public scrutiny, as they are
constantly judged by family, friends, and strangers, in a transformation of
pregnant bodies into objects of public concern. This pervasive surveillance
places the woman in a panopticon of observation and regulation of her
choices, leading to situations in which she may begin to self-regulate in response to these perceived pressures.
Constructions of "risk" surrounding and constituting pregnancy discourses are instrumental to the self-governance and self-discipline of the
pregnant body by the informal techniques of governance acting on women's
bodies. The fetus is often represented as a vulnerable entity whose future
existence, health, and well-being lie in the hands of the pregnant woman.
However, in what is effectively a contradiction of this sole responsibility,
pregnant women are also expected to entrust their bodies to the expertise of
the medical community to regulate the fetus in a "responsible" transfer of
control to experts."o Throughout their pregnancy and labour women are encouraged, even expected, to seek the expertise of health-care experts who
evaluate, monitor, and regulate the fetus through a range of techniques including ultra-sound, genetic screening and testing, amniocentesis, and fetal

9 Jana Sawicki, "Disciplining Mothers: Feminism and the New Reproductive Technologies"
in Janet Price & Margrit Shildrik, eds, Feminist Theory and the Body: A Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) 190.
*

See Lupton (1999), supra note 37 at 68. It should be noted that the experience of women
in the care of an obstetrician might be very different from the experience of women tinder
the care of a midwife. Midwifery often takes a very different approach to risk than does
obstetrical care, and, in fact, many women report that they seek a midwife in an explicit
attempt to distance themselves from many of the risk practices described here. See e.g.
Brenda Lane, "Midwife or Obstetrician: How to choose between a midwife and an obstetrician for your birth" (4January 2007), online: Suite 101 <http://www.suite 01.com>;
Charlotte Grayson, "Choosing a Pregnancy Practitioner" (21 January 2002), online:
MedicineNet <http://www.medicinenet.com>. There is also an indication that some
midwives who work with vulnerable populations (e.g. drug and alcohol users and smokers) do not automatically counsel women to stop use during pregnancy. See Diane Phillips
et al,"Factors that Influence Women's Disclosures ofSubstance Abuse During Pregnancy:
A Qualitative Study of Ten Midwives and Ten Pregnant Women" (2007) 37 Journal of
Drug Issues 357 at 364. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for these insights.
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monitoring."
While we seek to expose and investigate the selection and construction of
risks" and the interests that such discourses of risk serve, this is not to deny
that "real" risks may exist in pregnancy, some of which may be associated
with some maternal behaviours.12 It is the taken-for-grantedness of risky
pregnancy constructions that must be interrogated; the invisibility of"pregnancy risk" as a discourse indicates how thoroughly embedded and pervasive
it is in our culture and within our informal regulatory institutions.
The "pregnancy risk" discourse thus governs the range of options available for women in terms of their behaviour in pregnancy, and carries with it
evaluative judgment and blame when the technical and purportedly "amoral"
rules for a safe pregnancy are not followed. O'Malley suggests that contemporary risk techniques are part of a movement towards a model of regulation
that is "categorical and predictive."" Thus, risk governance focuses mainly on
behaviours and general "harm reduction" using statistics rather than direct
moral persuasion. Ours is the generation of "statistically graded pregnant
women", according to Rapp."
A prominent example of this type of statistically-graded risk categorization comes from medical practice in relation to offering screening to pregnant women for Down syndrome and other common fetal anomalies. Because currently available screening methods are non-invasive to the fetus and
minimally invasive to the mother, it has become standard practice in Canada
to offer such prenatal screening to all pregnant women."5 Amniocentesis,
5

Differences in practice can exist depending upon whether care is provided by an obstetrician or midwife, with women under the care of midwives often choosing to undergo
fewer, different or no prenatal screens or tests. See Suzanne Hope Suarez, "Midwifery is
not the Practice of Medicine" (1993) 5 YaleJL & Feminism 315 at 338.

52

Ernest L Abel & Michael Kruger, "Physician Attitudes Concerning Legal Coercion of
Pregnant Alcohol and Drug Abusers" (2002) 186 Am J Obstetrics & Gynecology 768.

5

O'Malley,supra note 11 at 294.

54

Rayna Rapp, "Risky Business: Genetic Counselingin a Shifting World" in Jane Schneider
& Rayna Rapp, eds, ArticulatingHidden Histories:Exploringthe Influence ofEric R Wolf
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) 175 at 180.

5

Anne M Summers et al, "Prenatal Screening for Fetal Aneuploidy" (2007) 187Journal of
Obstetrics & Gynecology Canada 146.
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which involves a slight risk of pregnancy loss, would only be used to reliably
confirm a positive indication from initial non-invasive screening, or as a form
of initial screening if the woman's age at the time of becoming pregnant was
forty years or more, at which age the risk of giving birth to a child with
Down syndrome is higher than the risk of losing a pregnancy as a result of
amniocentesis. 6
Generally, the separation of governance rationales from an overt moral
stance has been seen as responsible for the success of such strategies. However, while they frequently come across as technical and neutral, such strategies simultaneously assign moral blameworthiness to individuals for their
failure to prevent risk or harm. This is evident in the risk calculus employed
in determining to whom to offer particular types of prenatal screening. Implicit in basing the decision to offer screening on the likelihood of losing a
pregnancy as a result of amniocentesis is the idea that it is as "bad" or harmful to give birth to a child with Down syndrome as it is to lose a pregnancy.
Thus, a narrow focus on the techniques of harm reduction tends to obscure
the moral aspect of this regulation, in this case by not examining the complex
and often misconceived implications ofgiving birth to a child with a disability.57
Popular women's magazines direct pregnant women to eat healthily;" be
attentive to their levels of folate, calcium, and iron;9 cut down on coffee; 60
5
5

Ibidat 149.
For a discussion of these issues as they relate to current prenatal screening practice, cf
Mark Pioro, Roxanne Mykitiuk &Jeff Nisker, "Wrongful Birth Litigation and Prenatal
Screening" (2008) 179 Can Med Assoc J 1027.

5

See e.g. "Tips for a Healthy Pregnancy" Today' Parent,Pregnancy & Birth 3:1 (Spring
2003) 44 ["Tips"]. See also Suzanne Schlosberg, "Tell Me What to Eat" (October/November 2007), online: FitPregnancy <http://www.firpregnancy.com>.

5

See e.g. Nancy Gottesman, "Top Pregnancy Nutrient: Folate" (June/July 2008), online:
FitPregnancy <http://www.firpregnancy.com>; Gloria McVeigh, "Stop a Childhood
Cancer in Your Womb" Prevention 56:4 (April 2004) 68; Suzanne Schlosberg, "What
You Eat = Your Baby's Future" (August/September 2008), online: FirPregnancy <http://
www.firpregnancy.com>.

6

See e.g. Marty Munson & Gary Gutfield, "Baby and Java Don't Jibe: To Get Pregnant or
Stay that Way, Try Putting the Cap on Caffeine" Prevention 46:5 (May 1994) 26.
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quit smoking;" and to consume absolutely no alcohol at any time (a message
prominently featured in glossy brochures and posters displayed at liquor
stores and licensed establishments).6 2 Experts also warn pregnant women of
the dangers of mercury in fish in the same breath as extolling the benefits of
the omega-3 fatty acids therein. 3 Other everyday, and often unavoidable,
activities are described as risky and hazardous in the context of the pregnant
woman. Pregnant women are generally encouraged to remain active; however, exercise is considered hazardous to the fetus under certain circumstances." Experts also warn of the hazards of more benign activities such as
lifting, pumping gas, painting the nursery, and even working." Similar advice
can be found on the Ontario provincial government's health website. There
are links to sites on fetal alcohol syndrome; "active living for moms ; treating the mother, protecting the unborn"; and a link to the March of Dimes
site "during your pregnancy", where women are advised to avoid alcohol,
smoking marijuana, avariety of drugs and herbs, abuse, hazardous substances,

61

See e.g. "Tips,"supranote 58 (warning against the risks of first- and second-hand smoke).

62

See generally Be Safe: Have an Alcohol-Free Pregnancy-Informationfor Health Care
Providers, online: Ontario Best Start <http://www.alcoholfreepregnancy.ca/eng/hlth
care.html>. See also Judith Springer Riddle, "Protect Your Daughter" Prevention 55:4
(April 2003) 165. These attempts to informally govern pregnant women's lifestyles are in
spite of the fact that alcohol use during pregnancy is relatively common (and formally legal): The National Institute on Drug Abuse estimates that about 19 per cent ofwomen in
the US have used alcohol while pregnant. See Ernest L Abel & Michael Kruger, "Physician Attitudes Concerning Legal Coercion of Pregnant Alcohol and Drug Abusers"
(1995) 186 Am J Obstetrics & Gynecology 768.

6

See e.g. Barbara Loccher, "Should I eat fish during my pregnancy? I've heard conflicting
advice" Prevention 56:1 (January 2004) 99 (citing the benefits ofomega-3 fatty acids for
the growing fetus). See also "Good Question: Is fish still safe to eat?" Today' Parent,
Pregnancy and Birth 4:2 (Autumn 2004) 10; Lisa Murphy, "The Healthiest Catch"
Chatelaine 75:7 (July 2002) 85.

6

See e.g. "Tips," supra note 58.

61

See generally "Tips,"supra note 58; "Can my environment harm my unborn baby?" Today'sParent,Pregnancy&Birth 3:2 (Autumn 2003) 34; Beth M lovinelli, "Can pumping
gas during pregnancy hurt mybaby?", online: BabyZone <http://www.babyzone.com>;
"Is it safe to paint during pregnancy?", online: BabyCenter <http://www.babycenter.ca>.
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mercury, and rodents. Some of this advice is not just impractical, but insensitive: it ignores social location by treating alcohol use as if it is not caught up
in addiction, abuse as if it is not related to power and isolation, and the
avoidance ofhazardous substances as if pregnant women have the bargaining
power in an employment relationship.
The links between formal and informal governance of pregnancy are numerous and often result in a grid of regulation in which the origin of the
norm (state or informal) is difficult to discern. 6 Women who are visibly
pregnant and choose to continue to engage in particular taboo behaviours
such as smoking, drinking alcoholic beverages, eating fish, or even continuing
to work in a stressful environment, may be surprised by the amount of public
disdain directed towards them. In most pregnancies, women will not be
aware of the direct forces of formal governance by state bodies acting on their
choices. However, they are likely to be aware of the disciplining of their bodies through public perceptions ofsocially appropriate behaviour for pregnant
women. In indirect ways, a community acts upon pregnant bodies through
communication of expectations of "appropriate" behaviour for pregnant
mothers. Women who are pregnant are closely monitored and an awareness
of this surveillance along with a possible internalization of the goals of "producing" a healthy baby may mean obedience to public expectations even
when free of the public or medical gaze: a pregnant woman may learn to selfsurveil. Such surveillance practices, it is argued, constitute the body and in-

6

The example of folate, or folic acid, serves to illustrate. Both direct and indirect means are
employed from a public health perspective, aimed at reducing the incidence of 1eural
tube defects. For example, direct state intervention has resulted in an increasing number
of food products, such as flour, whole grain breads and pastas being fortified with folic
acid. Health Canada states that, "[b]ecause of concern that public education campaigns
alone would not be effective in achieving optimal periconceptional folic acid intake for
the majority of women," food fortification with folic acid was implemented in December
1996. See Health Canada, "Evaluation of Food Fortification with Folic Acid for the Primary Prevention of Neural Tube Defects" (3 December 2004), online: Public Health
Agency of Canada <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/faaf/chap3-cng.php>. Indirect
methods are also employed, with women "ofchild-bearing potential" repeatedly informed
of their "obligations" to take folate supplements not only when pregnant, but also when
contemplating pregnancy.
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vite individuals to govern themselves, observing and monitoring their own
behaviour through the operation of disciplinary power.67
This type of governance, which, as Alan Hunt notes,'6 may be regarded as
moral regulation, often does not originate from formal institutions of governance but instead can be a bottom-up process which may later be reflected
in formal government policy and adjudication. Moral discourses are less explicit in contemporary times, functioning instead through their "proxies":
appeals to avoid technical and supposedly "objective" hazards and harms. 69
Pregnant women are evaluated against a good mother/bad mother standard
by their own practices of harm reduction and risk avoidance, as these concepts are commonly understood. In this way, ordinary lifestyle choices and
consumption of goods are moralized: Women eating junk-food, lifting groceries, or drinking a glass of wine, have these otherwise "normal" behaviours
transformed and moralized by the discourses of risk that surround their
pregnant bodies. Governance from "below" is ubiquitous. Whether through
chiding from friends, relatives, and strangers for engaging in particular activities, or through community health projects for expectant mothers, the discourse creates moralized subjects (the mother) and objects (the fetus) to be
acted upon with moralizing practices.
Public health projects are another means ofgoverning bodies, with some
persons' bodies, like those of pregnant women, for example, being more susceptible to regulation and surveillance attempts.0 According to Green et al, a
"new psycho-socio-epidemiological model, based on population surveillance,
'risk' and healthy lifestyles" has been introduced in recent years." Largely on
67

See Sarah Nettleton, "Women and the New Paradigm of Health and Medicine" (1996)
16:48 Critical Social Policy 33 at 47.

68

See Alan Hunt, GoverningMorals:A Social History ofMoral Regulation (Cambridge:
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Cambridge University Press, 1999).
See Alan Hunt, "Risk and Moralization in Everyday Life" in Ericson & Doyle, supra note
30, 165 at 182.
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See Alan R Petersen & Deborah Lupton, The New PublicHealth:Health and Selfin the
Age ofRisk (London: Sage Publications, 1996).
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Eileen E Green, Diane Thompson & Frances Griffiths, "Narratives of Risk: Women at
Midlife, Medical 'Experts' and Health Technologies" (2002) 4 Health, Risk & Society
273 at 277.
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the basis of "health promotion," "we are being subjected to a form of social
control based on 'normalizing' health narratives founded on self-regulation,
self-monitoring and the avoidance of 'risk,' through developing healthy lifestyles and keeping well." 2 This shift in health policy is thought to have "engendered new internal forms of self-surveillance" as well.73
This risk-based social control of pregnant women may extend beyond the
time of pregnancy and target all women of child-bearing potential. For example, one report of the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention attempts to promote the health of future children by making recommendations that are primarily aimed at all women from menarche to
menopause, regardless of whether they intend to become pregnant or not."
The recommendations, which include maintaining a healthy weight and giv7
could involve a radical change in a woman's life for the beneing up alcohol,"
fit of a person that may or may not be born in the future. This policy strategy
makes risk avoidance strategies the guiding ethical principle, and both problematically assumes a shared standard of what a "healthy" child is, and downplays health determinants that are not based on individual behaviour, such as
poverty, inadequate housing, and lack of health insurance.76
Much of the moral regulation of pregnant women materializes through
the privileging of expert knowledge. Programs are established which set out
exemplary practices for pregnant women-such as eating healthily, taking
vitamin supplements, and going for prenatal diagnostic tests-in a reflexive
process of establishing and reinforcing discourses of maternal/fetal health
and maternal responsibility for minimizing risks. While these programs ap72

Ibid. See also Nettleton, supra note 67.
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Green, Thompson & Griffiths,supra note 71 at 277.
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See CDC, Department of Health and Human Services, "Recommendations to Improve
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pear at first glance to be technical and based upon care for the health of
pregnant women and their unborn children, "there is no neat line distinguishing power from care."7 7 Responsibility and blame for the increased possibility of disease or damage is assigned through the technique of risk: As
harm is conceptualized as calculable and preventable, the mother becomes
blameworthy if she does not engage in approved risk-reduction strategies.
The pregnant woman must rely upon the expertise of others to have what is
condoned as a "safe" and "responsible" pregnancy: "risk is the calculating
concept that modulates the relations between fear and harm."7 Health promotion based on statistical probabilities in the context of pregnancy can thus
be viewed as the imposition of a moral technology. By being made aware of
risks, the expectant mother is expected to provide for and discipline the future. As Robertson notes, however, "this experience does not occur in a vacuum; such experience is always situated, located-socially, politically, and
historically."79
Since the advance of technologies for monitoring fetal development and
health, such as ultrasound technologies, previously invisible and embodied
processes become more public and open to inspection.so Foucault believed
that through practices of increasing visibility, the increasingly penetrating
medical gaze becomes seen as natural and necessary: "What was fundamentally invisible is suddenly offered to the brightness of the gaze, in a movement
of appearance so simple, so immediate that it seems to be the natural consequence ofa more highly developed experience."" As the physical processes of
pregnancy become more visible, and the likelihood of harm more predict-

n
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able, there has been an accompanying responsibilization" upon women for
the "riskiness" of their behaviours in pregnancy.
Prenatal screening and diagnostic practices such as amniocentesis, ultrasound tests, and maternal serum screening, among others, are discursive in
their re-framing of pregnancy, and while designed to create relief and assurance of safety, also create anxiety." The construction of these tests and
screens as necessary reconfigures the experience of pregnancy: "[i]n late
modernity not to engage in risk avoidance constitutes a failure to take care of
the self "" and possible future selves." Thus risk rationalities not only responsibilize,or create compliant, self-regulating pregnant women, but in the process and by default, they also define and "call into being" "risky" pregnancies."
The impulse to warn pregnant mothers about "risky" behaviours is based
on an "assumption that knowledge and awareness of the danger of certain
activities will result in avoidance of these activities."" But this view tends not
to account for the influence of "sociocultural contexts within which risk perception takes place" For example, when risk is believed to be imposed on a
fetus because of the lack of willpower, addiction, carelessness, weakness, or
laziness of the expectant mother, the moral blameworthiness of her act is
increased." As Lupton states:
Ironically, there has been an increasing emphasis upon apprising individuals
of their own responsibility for engaging in risky [behaviours] at the same
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time as the control of individuals over the risks in their working and living
environments has diminished. 90
Focus on the individual lifestyle habits of a pregnant woman rather than
on other factors, such as the known social determinants of health-a steady
income, adequate housing, and social supports-is thought to reflect the
general trend towards private responsibility for health. There is a shift from
communal notions of health to an individualized or private locus of the
problem: the woman's body and behaviour.9' This is characteristic of the project of neo-liberalism and its goals of enterprise and self-care. An "at-risk"
consciousness "contributes to the emergence ofa particular form ofsubjectivity-that is a particular way of thinking about, relating to and situating the
self in terms of the broader social and political context within which the self
is embedded/located." 92 In fact, the particular subjectivity activated by current discourses on health and risk has been characterized as the "entrepreneurial subject,"9 capturing the notion, as Robertson argues, that life is an enterprise.94 This consciousness thus demands that individuals, including expectant women, adopt a "calculative and prudent attitude with respect to risk
and danger."" Likewise, Nikolas Rose suggests that under neo-liberal regimes
of health, "individuals are to become ... entrepreneurs of themselves, shaping
their own lives through the choices they make".9' Fault and blame, as we will
demonstrate, are cast onto the woman, as the responsibility for the health of
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her future child becomes privatized. The "duty to be well" that is implied by
public health discourses, and the call on individuals to take up and act on risk
information, are the conduits of the moral element. 7 In other words, when
risks are known, blame easily follows.98
The informal translation of risk to blame is situated within the larger
changing discourse of health at both a national and global level, reflecting
neo-liberal agendas. Women with children harmed in utero may be blamed,
as the injury can be conceptualized as the "fault" of the mother based on her
own personal choices and her individual failure to protect the fetus. This
move transforms health from a social good into a private commodity.99 However, it is also possible to look at the benefit-conferring properties of risk
techniques, particularly those that employ insurance as the risk-pooling
mechanism, as we will in Part V, and it is true that some benefits may be distributed through these techniques. Still, these trends towards an individualization and privatization of health reflect global economic trends towards a
neo-liberal and risk-based society in which increasing focus is placed upon
internal regulation and surveillance.
On the other hand, as Weir and Ruhl have made clear, 0oefforts to enlist
women in the governance of their own pregnancies cannot be said to derive
solely from neo-liberal ideas about active citizenship, nor do they represent
an "autonomous change in medical thought and practice"' 0' These efforts
must, in part, be attributed to feminist resistance to subordination by "experts": to demands that pregnant women be informed and empowered to not
only participate in, but to be in control of, to be made "agents" of, their own
experiences with pregnancy and childbirth (as demonstrated by the increase
in use of midwife-assisted births). And interestingly, it is concerns about
women's autonomy, forwarded by feminists, that has led to the resistance in
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the courts to the same translation between risk and blame that is so easily
made in the context of medical and popular discourses. In the next section,
we detail the trajectory of the Canadian jurisprudence on liability for prenatal injuries to demonstrate how and in what contexts this has happened.
B. RESISTANCE TO TRANSLATION: FORMAL STATE MECHANISMS
In contrast to medical and popular discourses that effectively regulate pregnant women's behaviour through the translation of risk to blame, the judiciary in Canada, in recent years, has been an ardent protector of women's bodily autonomy throughout pregnancy, even when women have not governed
themselves in expected ways. The judicial branch, in particular, can be seen as
a longstanding source of resistance to the spread of risk-based models in legal
decision-making, even in political contexts that regularly employ techniques
02
of risk in informal governance in creating attributions of fault and blame.1
Though at least one dated Canadian case sought to protect a fetus from the
risk of harm by the pregnant woman,'0o in general, Canadian courts at all
levels have steadfastly refused to make or enforce the link between risk and
blame.
This reluctance to hold a pregnant woman liable for a risk of harm to her
fetus can be seen in a number of controversial cases. 0 It is necessary here to
distinguish cases where harm to a born alive child has occurred in utero, from
cases where there is a risk that such harm may occur to an unborn child. Central to the approach taken by the courts is the fact that in Canadian law, a
fetus is not a legal person and does not have a legal identity separate from

102

O'Malley,supra note 11 at 304.
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204,7 RFL (3d) 191 (Prov Ct (Fan Div)), in which an unborn child was allowed to be
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104 See e.g. ReA (inutero) (1990),75 OR (2d) 82,72 DLR (4th) 722 (Unified Fan Ct);NH
v Children'sAidSociety ofRegionalMunicipality of Waterloo, [ 1996] OJ No 4788 (Ct J
(Prov Div)) (QL). The courts will, however, find liability where the legislation specifically
provides for it. See e.g. Dobson (Litigation Guardianof) v Dobson, [1999] 2 SCR 753,
174 DLR (4th) 1 [Dobson cited to SCR].

U.B.C. LAW REVIEW

332

VOL. 43:2

that of the woman carrying it.oI For example, in Re Baby R,"o6 the British
Columbia Supreme Court held that the Family and Child Services Department could not apprehend a child prior to birth, as an unborn child did not
meet the definition of "a child in need of protection" as required by the legislation. The court determined that the power to order apprehension of an
unborn child would have serious consequences for the rights and autonomy
of women. On the other hand, once a child has been born alive, courts have
looked to events that occurred while the child was in utero in making a finding that the child is "in need of protection".oI
Similar to Re Baby R, in Winnipeg ChildandFamily Services (Northwest
Area) vDFG, 0 the Supreme Court of Canada refused to grant a tort remedy, which would have amounted to an injunction in the form of physical
detainment and forced treatment, against a pregnant Aboriginal woman who
was addicted to glue sniffing. The majority of the court took the social circumstances of the pregnant woman into account, noting that she was doing
her best in a situation of "inadequate facilities and the ravages of addiction."o' The court also cited a number of policy arguments that mitigated
against the imposition of liability, such as the fact that current medical research would become relevant to a court's determination of risk; women in
lower socio-economic groups would be more negatively impacted; women
may come into conflict with friends and loved ones seeking to monitor and
police her behaviour; and finally, the court was also concerned that the impo-
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sition of liability could endanger women and babies by causing pregnant
women to avoid seeking medical treatment.
The state of the law in Canada followingDFG is that a tort action cannot
succeed against a pregnant woman on behalf of her fetus. In Dobson (Litigation Guardianof) vDobson,"o however, the Supreme Court of Canada faced
a slightly different question: Should a child, once born, have the right to sue
his mother for harms alleged to have occurred due to the mother's negligent
behaviour during pregnancy? The majority of the Court (consisting of a majority judgment and a concurring judgment endorsing the same result, but
emphasizing different reasons), answered in the negative, refusing to find a
mother liable for negligent driving that caused serious injury to her fetus.
This was notwithstanding that the child would be able to recover in these
circumstances had anyone but the mother been at fault. The majority judgment identified two main reasons why a pregnant woman should not owe a
duty of care to her fetus: first, it would entail severe implications for the privacy and autonomy rights of women; and second, it would be difficult to
articulate a sound standard for responsible conduct by pregnant women. A
"reasonable pregnant woman" standard, it was held, would lead to too much
scrutiny of pregnant women's lives and would unfairly prejudice women who
are poor, racialized, or abused. The concurring judgment emphasized Charter values, in particular that the liberty and equality rights of women would
be violated by a finding of liability in these circumstances. Both the majority
and concurring judgments were concerned with the implications of liability
for pregnant women's lives in many other circumstances. They also both
stated that the common law was incapable of carving out a narrow, categorical exception to the absence of duty of a mother to her child for injuries sustained while in utero (the proposed exception of course covering situations
involving negligent driving to the extent that third party insurance would
cover the damages). However, both the majority and concurring judgments
asserted that provincial legislatures could create such a regime through legislation.

"0 Supra note 104.
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The dissenting judgment held that a mother should be liable for injuries
to her born alive child where those injuries resulted from the negligent actions of the woman when the child was a fetus. The duty of care would only
apply, however, where a woman already owes a duty of care to other third
parties (such as when operating a motor vehicle). This precise issue was revisited again in Hall(LitigationGuardianof) v Kellar,"' in which the infant,
by its litigation guardian, brought a claim against his mother for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident while "en ventre sa mere." It was alleged
that the child's injuries were a direct result of the accident, caused by the
mother's negligence. She was eight months pregnant at the time. The Ontario Superior Court ofJustice followed the majority in Dobson, holding that
a legal duty of care cannot and should not be imposed upon a pregnant
woman towards her fetus, but, as in the Dobson case, leaves open the possibility that legislation could carve out a narrow exception to this general rule." 2
Rosamund Scott emphasizes the role played in shaping the judgments in
Dobson of "legal method" (or developing the law through jurisprudence versus legislation)."' She reviews the majority's attempts to describe driving as
legally indistinguishable from other forms of parenting or lifestyle choices a
pregnant woman may make, such as those concerning diet or "rollerblading,
shopping in a crowded mall, spraying weedkiller on her crops, sailing, lighting fireworks for her children on Canada day, or any other activity where
there is a risk of harm to the general public."" Citing American and Austra"'

(2002), 23 CCLT (3d) 40 (Ont Sup CtJ).

112
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owe a duty of care to the future child of the female patient. Recognizing a duty of care to
the future child would result in conflicting duties on the physician, whose responsibility is
to his female patient. For a discussion of the issue of conflicting duties owed to children
and families in the child protection context, see also SylApps Secure Treatment Centrev
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lian case law, she argues that the distinction is possible, and explains that the
majority in Dobson was unwilling to engage in shaping the common law in an
area involving "highly sensitive public policy and insurance issues"."' Regard-

ing insurance, Scott finds a contradiction between the majority's public policy finding that a duty would threaten the interests ofpregnant women, and
the fact that accessing insurance funds would have been in the interest of
both the child and the mother in this case." This accordingly is another reason the court suggested the legislature tackle the issue. Scott concludes her
discussion of motor vehicle insurance and maternal-fetal duty by observing
that because third party injury motor vehicle insurance is mandatory and
widespread, it begins to look like a first-party insurance regime. She considers
replacing the costly tort system with a formal system of first-party insurance,
though she notes that this position has been held as impractical."7 In Part V
we consider in detail how insurance relates to maternal tort liability and the
imposition of blame in pregnancy.
The courts' reluctance to make an easy translation from risk to blame
cannot only be seen in limits to rights relating to fetuses and injuries sustained while in utero, but also in the judicial treatment of "risks." Courts, in
general, will not take judicial notice of risky behaviour or situations, preferring to rely on the evidence of those who have specific knowledge of the
pregnant woman's actions or medical situation, or who are experts in the field
of fetal risks. For example, inAJv Yukon Territory (Familyand ChildrenServices, Director),"8 the Supreme Court of Yukon held that a law allowing a
woman to be required to participate in supervision or counselling because of
a risk that her unborn child could be affected by Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
would unjustifiably infringe the woman's Charterrights. In particular, the
court found that the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of the meaning
of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (which was mentioned in the statute but not defined). Although long accepted that alcohol can harm the fetus, the court
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held that a precise definition of the syndrome must be established before it
could be decided if the fetus was at serious risk of suffering from it.
In ReA (in utero),"I the Ontario Unified Family Court accepted evidence from a psychiatrist that the father fit within the diagnosis of Antisocial
Personality Disorder, and from a psychologist that he was prone to temper
outbursts and threats of violence. The court also accepted evidence that the
mother had lied to authorities about her prenatal care, and expert evidence
from a pediatrician about the need for highly supervised care in this case due
to risks to both mother and child. In the end, however, the court did not order apprehension because the legislation did not extend protection to unborn children.
In New Brunswick (Ministerof Health and Community Services) v NH
(Litigationguardianof),o the mother admitted to consuming drugs and
alcohol in two prior pregnancies, but there was no evidence of substance
abuse in this pregnancy. In the result, the New Brunswick Court of Queen's
Bench held that a legislative provision which gave the Minister of Health and
Community Services power to grant a Supervisory Order over unborn children was an unjustified infringement of the Charter.In part, the court was
concerned that the legislation set out no parameters for intervention with
respect to unborn children. For example, the court wondered whether the
Minister could take into account the woman's past conduct, and how the
Minister would judge her present conduct (for example, if a woman smoked,
overate, was sedentary or was overactive). The court was also concerned that
the legislation did not differentiate between the developing stages of the fetus. Could the Minister intervene at any time or only when the fetus is viable? Ultimately, the court was not satisfied with the statute's imprecise
terms, suggesting that there must be some clarity in the statute about the
meaning of "risk to a fetus' Further, recall that inDFG the court noted that a
determination of risky behaviour must occur in a social context: there, one in
which a pregnant Aboriginal woman was addicted to glue sniffing. The court
held that the risk to the fetus must be considered in the context of the

1'9 Supra note 104.
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mother's personal struggle with addiction and inadequate social resources.
The court also noted that using medical research and expertise to evaluate
risk would be dangerous and would disproportionately affect certain groups
of women. '2
As Valverde et al demonstrated in 2005, contemporary risk-based governance "[does] not necessarily involve parachuting scientific or technical experts to make determinations of risk in legal contexts." 2 2 With respect to
judicial hearings on whether community notification should occur upon the
release of a sex offender, for example, Valverde et al found that consideration
of the risks of recidivism often feature legally-trained personnel such as
prosecutors or judges assuming the task of measuring or assessing risks on the
basis of "common knowledge:' or, at least, a hybrid mix of expert and everyday knowledge. But with respect to the "risks" inherent in pregnancy, courts
have not adopted the risk assessments embedded in the popular and medical
discourses as "common sense." Here again we see the law in the area of maternal tort liability, with few exceptions, as a site of resistance. While it is
clear that the informal regulation of pregnant women invariably involves actors drawing on a "common fund"' of knowledge, expert and everyday, to
draw conclusions about "risky behaviours" and to pass judgment on pregnant
bodies, the formal avenues of state law have steered clear of this.
In this way, one can view the jurisprudence reviewed above as maintaining separation between legal and health/medical knowledge.' 24 While the
former maintains the legal fiction of birth as the commencement of personhood in order to protect the rights ofwomen, the latter employs risk analysis
to arrive at "[e]stimates of the probability of negative health outcomes from
exposures", and implies that women be held accountable for these.'12 In turn,
government bodies such as child welfare agencies, from the perspective of
Foucauldian population power, attempt to "prevent perinatal risk even in the
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absence of individual harm in order to reduce the population of children
who were its permanent wards.""' In contrast, focusing on individual rights
and equity, courts have recognized that because the physical location of the
fetus is inside the woman's body,' 7 and because as a consequence a woman
can never be alone but may anytime affect the fetus through her actions, the
protection of the bodily integrity of women requires that they not be treated
as third party tort defendants whose lives are not constantly affected by the
existence of the fetus.12 1 In addition, it is not just any pregnant women who
are subject to informal risk-based regulation, but those in lower socioeconomic groups.129 Almost all of the women involved in the cases discussed
here are Aboriginal.'10
In contrast with the efforts of branches of government such as child welfare agencies, as outlined in the cases above, other bodies of formal governance in Canada, such as the legislature and the judiciary, have been stalwart
protectors of women's autonomy over their own bodies throughout pregnancy. Until the recent extension of liability for fetal harm to mothers in
cases of negligence in automobile accidents in Alberta, to be explored in the
next section, pregnant women have been formally treated in law as not culpable for harm to their fetuses, even when other parties may be held responsible for such resulting harms. These high standards of protection for women
have not been reflected in myriad other informal means of regulation of
pregnant women's behaviour: instead, the dominant discourse is one in
which the behaviours ofpotential mothers, and in particular-their risk governance choices-are seen as directly and almost solely determinant of the
health of the unborn.
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IV. TRANSLATING RISK TO BLAME
Canadian law has traditionally and steadfastly refused to assign legal blame
and responsibility to mothers for harms to the fetus before birth, even in
situations of her negligence. A fairly recent legislative change in Alberta,
however, may indicate a reversal of this trend. The Maternal TortLiability
Act"' came into force on 1 December 2005. It amends the law of maternal
liability for harm to a fetus by permitting a child, once born, to sue its
mother in cases of automobile accidents in which the pregnant mother was at
fault and her fetus was injured.3 2 Importantly, the Act restricts liability to the
extent of the motor vehicle insurance coverage."' The current state of the
common law, as the previous section detailed, allows the injured child, once
born, to sue anyone except the mother, the rationale for this being that if the
child is able to sue the mother for damages inflicted upon it while in the
wortb, this may open the door for claims against mothers for 'risky' lifestyle
choices during pregnancy, leading to restrictions on her autonomy. The legislative change was prompted by the case of Rewega."' In that case the pregnant woman was operating a vehicle when she lost control, causing it to roll.
She was five months pregnant at the time. Her child was born prematurely
with severe cognitive and physical injuries, including blindness. Following
Dobson, the child had no cause of action against the mother.
In this part, we examine the Alberta legislation in context and ask: What
are the implications of tightening the link between risk and blame in this
situation? A weakness of the governmentality approach is that it often reduces risk governance "to a reflex of political ideology" which is thought to
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compromise the capacity of the approach "to evaluate the benefits of different risk-based approaches."' Thus, by closely parsing the intentions and the
expected effects of the legislation here, where it seems to facilitate the translation between risk and blame so far resisted by formal law, we can evaluate,
rather than assume, the politics of the risk governance technique. Does the
tie to insurance coverage, in this case, mitigate the individualizing effect? Is
risk-based governance, in this case, more effective at delivering resources to
the harmed? Does the "effect of the legislation", as Ali states, simply amount
to "providing financial assistance to women who have children with special
needs" ? 1
A.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRANSLATION FROM RISK TO BLAME IN
THE MTLA IN THE CONTEXT OF CONCERNS ABOUT WOMEN'S
AUTONOMY

In Dobson, the action was brought on the child's behalf by his maternal
grandfather, with the apparent support of the child's mother. The action was
defended by the mothers' insurer. A finding of legal liability would have provided the child's family with the resources required to provide him with services required as a result of his special needs. In the words of the court: "the
material interests of the mother and child are aligned, notwithstanding the
fact that their legal relationship is adversarial."'I' This situation has led many
commentators to conclude that the Court in this case "upheld [the mother's]
abstract rights at the expense of the very real needs of herself and her
child."'
The Dobson case is controversial because it raises the tension between the
potentially very dangerous consequences of imposing a general tort liability
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on pregnant women with respect to their unborn children, and the desire to
compensate and support injured children with special needs (and their families). The refusal to impose maternal tort liability for prenatal negligencean "exception" carved out in tort law to protect women's autonomy over their
bodies-leaves an injured child (and his or her family) without recourse to
insurance, and thus often without resources. This is obviously not a desired
result. But finding a duty of care, as several courts have concluded, would
lead to increased surveillance ofwomen and in particular, ofpregnant bodies.
Further, commentators have argued that state surveillance of pregnancy
would do little to ensure that children are born healthy."'
In justifying the exception, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada in
Dobson notes the "fundamental difference between a mother-to-be and a
third-party defendant":
The unique relationship between a pregnant woman and her foetus is so very
different from the relationship with third parties. Everything the pregnant
woman does or fails to do may have a potentially detrimental impact on her
foetus. Everything the pregnant woman eats or drinks, and every physical action she takes, may affect the foetus. Indeed, the foetus is entirely dependent
upon its mother-to-be. Although the imposition of tort liability on a third
party for prenatal negligence advances the interests of both mother and
child, it does not significantly impair the right of third parties to control
their own lives. In contrast to the third-party defendant, a pregnant woman's
every waking and sleeping moment, in essence, her entire existence, is connected to the foetus she may potentially harm. If a mother were to be held liable for prenatal negligence, this could render the most mundane decision
taken in the course of her daily life as a pregnant woman subject to the scrutiny of the courts.
Is she to be liable in tort for failing to regulate her diet to provide the best
nutrients for the foetus? Is she to be required to abstain from smoking and all
alcoholic beverages? Should she be found liable for failing to abstain from

strenuous exercise or unprotected sexual activity to protect her foetus? Must
she undertake frequent safety checks of her premises in order to avoid falling
and causing injury to the foetus? There is no rational and principled limit to
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UB.C. LAW REVIEW

342

VOL. 43:2

the types ofclaims which may be brought ifsuch a tortious duty ofcare were
imposed upon pregnant women.'o
Extending maternal liability poses additional threats to the autonomy of
pregnant women. This is so, first, because it is difficult if not impossible to
articulate a standard of conduct for pregnant women. Such a standard would,
in the words of the majority judgment in Dobson, "involve an analysis of the
risks associated with a given activity, the gravity of the possible injury, and
the likelihood of that injury occurring"' Such a standard is inappropriate as
it "raises the spectre of judicial scrutiny and potential liability imposed for
'lifestyle choices'."" A court could, for example, find that a woman "should
not smoke cigarettes or drink alcohol.""' Further, "the great disparities which
exist in the financial situations, education, access to health services and ethnic backgrounds of pregnant women.... would inevitably lead to an unfair
application of a uniform legal standard concerned with the reasonable pregnant woman."1
A second way in which extending liability would threaten the autonomy
of pregnant women is in the potential imposition of tort remedies, namely
the payment of damages and injunctions. Because the fetus is physically located inside the body of the pregnant woman,"' indeed, it is part of the body
of the pregnant woman, and because the pregnant woman can never be
alone, 4' imposing a duty in tort would mean that "each choice made by the
woman in relation to her body will affect the fetus and potentially attract
tort liability."'4 7 For these same reasons, an injunction could involve the involuntary physical detention of the pregnant woman. On this issue, the ma-
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jority in DFG stated that "the principles of tort law have never been used to
justify the forcible detention and mandatory treatment of a person", and that
"[t]he order at issue on this appeal can be upheld only by a radical extension
of civil remedies into the most sacred sphere of personal liberty-the right of
every person to live and move in freedom."'14
What is the effect of the MTLA? Is it, as Ali states, simply to provide
funds to women who have children with special needs?' We argue that the
legislation provides for compensation to flow to some women who have children with special needs, but only a narrowly circumscribed group. Whose
child qualifies for compensation under the Act? A child born with special
needs, as a result of a car accident in which her mother drove negligently and
has car insurance, will recover. These mothers are excepted from the maternal
tort immunity by the legislation. Who is still subject to the immunity? Nonnegligent mothers who were drivers in an accident that injured their future
child; non-negligent mothers who were not in car accidents and whose child
was born with special needs; and negligent mothers who were in car accidents that injured their future child but are not insured. In all of these cases,
the mother will not be excepted from the immunity and the child will not
recover.
In other words, babies suffering harms that cannot be tied to negligence
will not be candidates for compensation. Thus, a potential unfairness exists
between children born injured due to a car accident in which their mother
drove negligently while they were still in utero, and children injured in an
accident not due to negligence. The needy child of the negligent mother
would recover from her insurance company, and the needy child of the nonnegligent mother would not.' Nor would the needy child of the uninsured
mother recover, whether she drove negligently or not. And perhaps most
importantly, the child born with special needs that cannot be attributed to
any accident at all, perhaps to any cause at all, will not be compensated. If the
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intent of the legislation is not to burden mothers or families financially
(which was articulated as the rationale for limiting liability to the extent of
the mother's insurance coverage), it accomplishes this goal for only a narrow
set of women. If the unfairness that the legislation aims to address is that between children born with special needs injured by negligent third parties
prior to their births, and those injured by the negligent behaviour of their
mothers before their births, the legislation addresses one inequity while leaving several others intact.
A further remaining unfairness arises from, as Ali acknowledges, the fact
that compensation is restricted to the amount of the mother's insurance coverage, which might differ drastically between families.'' Two children who
suffer similar injuries, in identical circumstances, may receive vastly different
compensation awards, and will thus have access to different levels of support
and services where they are provided on the basis of an ability to pay. This
issue also emerged in the legislative debates surrounding the passage of the
MTLA. One member remarked, "If people have different levels of insurance,
you know, is this the way by which we're going to determine the care of
someone who needs care as a disabled person?"' 52 Proponents of the Act,
however, acknowledged that it was not meant to be a comprehensive solution, and asserted that it would create a narrow avenue for compensation or
close a gap in the tort system in a small way. One member described the function of the Act as creating "a very narrow exception'.'"
As Hannah-Moffat and O'Malley have noted, analyses of risk governance
techniques rarely pay adequate attention to "gender, racial and ethnic differences, or to the social, economic and political contexts in which these tools
are deployed".'" In this case, those most likely to be affected by infringement
on their liberty and autonomy by further surveillance and judging of pregnant women's behaviours-racialized and marginalized women, including
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Aboriginal women as the cases demonstrate, particularly those that are streetinvolved or who struggle with addiction-are the least likely to benefit from
the extension of liability, i.e. they are the least likely to be insured. Not only
are the discourses of risk governance "structured by class,"'" but the risk governance technique chosen to ameliorate the situation for women-the imposition of liability-takes class as its central organizing framework.
As Ali notes, "[a] solution that would advance the objective of providing
compensation to families with children who have special needs would be the
creation of a fund that would assist all families in this situation, and not just
those who have automobile insurance whose children were injured from negligent driving.""' In fact, CoryJ in Dobson suggested the creation of a fund to
cover prenatal injuries: 5 7
The Act may not provide the best solution to all families with children who
sustain prenatal injuries, but it does allow some children to recover some
compensation that would otherwise not be available because ofthe ruling in
Dobson."
A better solution, of course, would be to provide funding according to
need. In a truly collective or socialized model, services would be provided
instead of income or cash compensation to alleviate the consequences of adverse effects.' 9 Specifically, "[i]ncreasingstate funding for social support services would contribute much more to the well-being of those with special
needs than a legislatively-imposed standard of pre-natal care would, and the
pregnant woman's personal autonomy would not be violated."'6 While opponents in the Alberta legislature of the MTLA argued that the state was in
effect "trying to download the duty of care to insurance companies for chil-
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dren born alive with defects",'1' proponents countered that "[n]othing in this
legislation extinguishes any other government program, infringes upon, or
changes any assistance programs."16 2
A second effect of the legislation is that it essentially forces families to
turn to litigation (which is inherently adversarial and confrontational) for
their remedy, rather than to look to the state for support based on their genuine needs.' 6 As Ali suggests and the case law illustrates, this tends to increase
tension in the family unit, but it also inevitably imports notions of blame.
The Act creates the possibility of finding the mother liable, negligent, and
thus blameworthy in causing injuries to herself, as the carrier of the fetus, and
the subsequently-born child. Opponents of theMTLA in the Alberta legislature noted a concern with a possible "new raft of lawsuits, perhaps spurious
lawsuits, in regard to what might be perceived as an expansion of fetal rights
here in this province."'" Those who supported the bill, however, noted that
children are already able to sue for injuries sustained "prenatally against other
third parties and against other family members" and that the only function
of the Act would be to include the mother along with these others.'6 1 One
member also asserted that "this legislation doesn't assign any blame, determine any negligence or any liability",''6 while another noted that the Act
would not focus on "maternal responsibility" but on "the responsibility of a
person driving a car".' 7 The dynamic of blaming in the context of liability
and insurance is the topic of Part V.
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V. LIABILITY AND BLAME IN THE CONTEXT OF
INSURANCE
As outlined in Part II, the technique of "risk governance", as it is treated in
much of the current governmentality literature, is taken to be part of a neoliberal political project that has the effect of "individualizing" risk. In this
final part, we explore the connections between liability and insurance to analyze the possibility that, in the case of the MTLA, the linking of risk with
blame may not necessarily be an "individualizing move." In making the connection to the mother's insurance policy, the strategy seeks to compensate
the family by drawing on the collective resources of the insurance pool. How
should we evaluate the politics ofan insurance strategy as a way of managing
the "risk" of injury in pregnancy?
On the one hand, as Deborah Stone says, "[i]nsurance is not only an in8
Stone explains that insurstitution of repair, but also of social progress."Is
ance is one of the primary means utilized by communities to make life better
for individual members. Insurance fosters collaboration, provides security,
and offers a mechanism to reinforce a sense of community and collective well
being.' 9
On the other hand, Armstrong notes, insurance is also "the paradigmatic
form of risk management" within neo-liberal regimes.'o Neo-liberalism is
said to be in pursuit of the "'autonomization' of society: it seeks to achieve
the unmediated government ofindividuals by individuals"-and specifically
by rational, responsible individuals. '7'Thus while neo-liberalism's first choice
of governance strategies may be self-reliance; its second choice is undoubtedly private insurance. And even as "[i]nsurance becomes the institution of
governance", it remains governance-at-a-distance.'7 Thus, instead ofbuilding
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social solidarity and community, according to some scholars, the proliferation of private insurance can have the effect of fragmenting populations into
17
separate risk-rated communities, each with a monetary value. 1
But we must acknowledge that private insurance may also operate to
spread risk amongst the community."7 Even while insurance is a technology
of risk management, "it is also a technology of distribution, of risk sharing." 75
But the socializing of risk that happens through private insurance schemes is
contained within tight boundaries, and it may serve, perversely, to ease the
pressure on the state for genuine collective management and pooling of risk.
It is the commodification of a form of social security that could alternatively
be seen as the responsibility of the state-or the collective. Thus it is not surprising to see a contemporary government support a private insurance
scheme as a way of managing risk, because it is simultaneously a way ofreducing individual claims on collective resources, and it displaces state responsibility.
Also, in turning to insurance as a "collectivizing" strategy, the work of
governing is displaced from political systems where legislation and policy are
debated in public to administrative ones where regulations are issued in private by "insurer fiat".'7 In fact, as Heimer demonstrates, the regulation of
driving is now influenced much more through the risk management practices
of insurance companies than it is through the actions and decisions oflegislatures.177 Still, as the debate around the MTLA illustrates, "questions about
system design bring insurance back into the political realm" 78 Because insurance pools the savings of the community to pay for the losses of individuals,
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"whenever insurance is discussed, questions of allocating responsibility be17
Thus the
tween individuals and society are barely beneath the surface"."
question of which individuals will be included or excluded from the risk
pools that are produced by insurance becomes a key political question.'s It is
essentially about the "boundaries of risk-sharing communities""' and who is
eligible to participate in the decisions about where those boundaries should
be drawn.
Whether we accept a communal burden for adverse events, or treat them
as appropriately individual burdens, is defining of a society. The primary
foundation of insurance, according to Stone, "is collective responsibility for
harms that befall individuals".' But how this plays out differs as between
public and private schemes. In private, commercial insurance schemes, a
premium is charged to each policyholder to create a "fund from which those
who experience losses are compensated; recipients of compensation are those
who contributed to the fund or their designated beneficiaries"."I In public
schemes, the fund is built through taxation rather than premiums, and eligi4
ble recipients may be smaller or larger than the group of contributors.'
Recent trends in private insurance in the neo-liberal era are towards risk
"unpooling," towards increasing segmentation of the pool of insured. In fact,
according to Heimer, those "outside the system" now have more difficulty
"gaining a toehold" in an effective insurance arrangement than they might
have had when public schemes represented alternatives to commercial forms
of insurance.' Accordingly, Heimer concludes that private insurance
schemes offer a safety net of "fine resilient mesh" for the rich, but there are
6
much larger holes in the "loosely woven safety nets of the poor".1 And yet,
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"political demands for equality in insurance challenge the fundamental principle of actuarial fairness upon which most insurance operates".' 7 That principle demands the classification of people according to the degree of "risk"
they pose. Insurers argue that practices such as charging differential rates or
precluding certain groups are merely products of objective economic realities. While there are certain groups who may appear to be the targets of discrimination, in reality they are simply treated differently as they pose an increased risk of loss.' "Those seeking insurance expansion", as the families of
children with special needs who are not "caught in the net" of the liability
exception of the MTLA are in the context of this example, are "making the
quintessential democratic claim", according to Stone: "they are asserting their
membership in a community, their right to representation in its collective
decisions, and their right to equal treatment vis-hi-vis other citizens".'"
Part of an unpooling strategy by the insurers in response to this legislation might include the concentrating of women of child-bearing age in to
their own, now uniquely "risky" category, on the basis that they objectively
pose a greater risk of loss to the company. This raises the spectre of differential rates for women of child-bearing age.'" According to Ali, "[w]hile increased insurance premiums are a problem, this legislation would create the
larger problem of shifting what ought to be [a] state responsibility to the
insurance industry, thus undermining the principle of social responsibility
for those with special needs".' Whether the responsibility is shifted onto the
insurance companies, or more likely, onto "drivers" as a class, if not women
drivers, it undoubtedly raises the political question of the appropriate
boundaries for the risk sharing community. From this analysis, we can confirm that insurance as risk governance has both individualizingandsocializing elements, and that determining its politics is complicated. Importantly
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for us, a key complicating factor is the assignment of blame that comes with
liability, and which is a prerequisite for recovery under the legislation, notwithstanding the limited socializing of the risk that comes from the link to
insurance.
A.

THE ASSIGNMENT OF BLAME

Blame is directed at women as mothers from the moment of conception,
continuing throughout pregnancy, and the life of the child.' This is where
claims that regimes of risk governance can be said to be "amoral" fall short.
As Hannah-Moffat and O'Malley state, "we are intruded upon and disciplined by risk regimes meant to protect us from future harms, and if we fail
to buy in, we must suffer the consequences"." If harm can be predicted
through risk techniques, then to fall prey to harm is to be culpable.'
But the expectation that pregnant women and mothers will comply and
conform to the risk regimes, whether they are delivered through formal or
informal means, ignores the reality of the less than perfect circumstances in
which many women are required to parent,'95 or to be pregnant. In fact, criticism of pregnant women and mothers and the blame levelled against them
does not acknowledge the progressive difficulty of conditions wherein
women are forced to be mothers.'96 It is meted out based on the woman's
success or failure with respect to achieving the singular goal: a "healthy"
baby. It follows the birth without regard for the specific circumstances in
which women become and are pregnant,' 7 without regard for social, eco-
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nomic, or cultural constraints. As Samerski says of the pregnant woman, "all
at once she is responsible even for things that she cannot influence'"''
The easy translation of risk to blame that we observed in Part III with respect to the informal means of risk governance-the popular and medical
discourses-was grounded in risk's ability to predict future harms on the
basis of probabilities, and on its related promise to project blame on the individual for not buying into the risk regime, should harm materialize. In the
formal regime of risk governance enacted through the MTLA, the mechanism for ensuring that blame falls squarely on the mother is more direct:
proof of her negligence must be offered, and liability will follow. But in some
respects, we might say that the legislation is not a risk governance strategy at
all. The cause of action only comes into play once the child is born injured.
Harm is already evident; the notion of risk, of what might have happened, is
rendered irrelevant by the observation of what did happen.
Thus we can see that focusing on the translation between risk and blame
tends to obscure the link between risk and harm. Harm, of course, is proven
upon birth. At issue in Dobson was only the question ofwhether the cause of
action exists-left unexplored was the problematic question of whether it
would have been possible to prove that the prenatal negligent act causedthe
harm to the fetus. In tort law, a causal analysis is a necessary prerequisite to
the assignment of responsibility."' But the construction of a causal narrative
is a lot more straightforward with respect to a single catastrophic event, such
as a car accident, than it is with respect to "risky behaviours" like the consumption of drugs or alcohol, an "over-active" lifestyle, or the failure to take a
prenatal vitamin supplement. In these situations, often the best that will be
able to be argued is that the pregnant woman's behaviour increased the risk of
the harm to the fetus, and not that it causedthe harm. And so, allowing the
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cause of action in a very limited circumstance, such as a car accident, and
only once a child is born injured, is a much different endeavour than imposing restrictions on a woman's autonomy while she is still pregnant. Remember that risk can be forward-looking and predictive, but it is only once the
feared outcome materializes-once we are faced with harm-that risk's capacity for retribution is engaged.
In fact, a key difference in the dynamics of the translation from risk to
blame in the informal governance context versus in the litigation context
exists around the question of timing. As Landsman makes clear, there is a
difference between addressing the question of disabled infants hypothetically, within the framework of pregnancy, and addressing the question of
"defective" [sic] children at birth, within the context of "pregnancy's aftermath".200 The legislation in fact avoids the very difficult aspects of prenatal
"risk," by taking as its focus the child, once born. According to Landsman 20
an important part of the character of risk is its capacity for extending the
reach of governance: while "actual harm" typically must be proven, or at least
demonstrated, "risk of harm" can encompass almost anything. So, in situations where harm materializes, where a child is born with special needs, and a
car accident occurred, tying the harm to the "risky" (and thus culpable) behaviour is relatively straightforward. 202 More troubling are the situations left
untouched by the legislation; namely, those in which harm materializes-a
child is born with special needs-and yet, there is no obviously "risky" act to
attribute it to.
In the neo-liberal order, to justify the logic that someone be held to blame
for an adverse outcome, risk must be construed as a product of human
agency and therefore controllable through attributions of responsibility and
200
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processes of accountability".203 As Ericson et al note, "within a neo-liberal
regime of responsible risk taking all differences, and the inequalities that re2
And it is acknowledged that "a
sult from it, is seen as a matter of choice?"
core element of neo-liberalism in practice is the portrayal of inequality as
choice"120 5 In this model, the eventuality of an "unhealthy" baby is transformed from a communal responsibility into a private responsibility based on
the logic that it is an outcome that resulted from personal choices and actions.
There are many reasons to doubt that the outcome of an "unhealthy," an
injured, or a special needs baby, can in any real way be attributed to the personal choices and actions of its mother in the vast majority of cases. As one of
the popular pregnancy guides tells women, "only a small minority of birth
abnormalities ... can be explained by known hazards".2 0 6 For this reason, the
state of pregnancy itself is not an easy fit with a model of governance based
20 7
on insurance: there are too many potential risk factors operating at once.
Fetal health depends on a complex array of interacting variables. Further,
women do not "control" their pregnancies in any real sense :208 Economic factors influence access to prenatal care and its accessories, and social variables,
such as housing, domestic abuse, and addiction, condition women's relative
capacities to create a nurturing environment for the fetus and baby.
And still, despite the fact that little effort is made at actually assessing the
degree of agency women hold-the responsibility and blame for "abnormal"
or "unsuccessful" outcomes in pregnancy is located squarely with the individual woman. 20 9 In fact, middle class, educated women are among those who
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are most interested in appearing to be responsible,210 and it is with respect to
these women that the discourses most effectively produce a "desire to conform".2 1' Nonetheless, all women subject to this disciplinary power inevitably
gain the impression that being "responsible" during pregnancy will "guarantee" a desired outcome. 212 In fact, the very premise of the legislation is in furtherance of this myth: "that the outcome of a pregnancy depends on the
pregnant woman's responsible decision making"'
Governance mechanisms that frame problems in terms of risk and emphasize accountability open up the door for the "possibility of blame if
things go wrong".214 Lemke argues that it is the "recourse to 'risks' which
makes it possible to call for autonomy and self-regulation""' Early promoters
of social insurance schemes, as Stone notes, understood that an individual
should not be held responsible for risks that she could not mitigate against. 6
But in a neo-liberal order, children have become "the embodiment of their
parents' choices"' 17 with the result that "[m]others of children with disabilities make their way within a society that devalues their children and in which
their motherhood has 'failed' to follow the culturally appropriate trajectory.

We also must remember that "insurers regulate behaviour at the same
time as they spread risk".219 The term "moral hazard" is used to describe the
effect of insurance contracts on the behaviour of policyholders. In other
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words, it is an acknowledgement of the fact that insurance contracts alter
incentives. In the context of pregnancy risks, however, the concept falters.
The basic idea is that "because they no longer bear the full burden of looses,
policyholders have a diminished interest in preventing losses".220 The classic
example is that those that have purchased theft or fire insurance are less vigilant in preventing theft or fire, because they have less at stake. To draw the
parallel with the maternal tort liability scenario would require us to accept
that women who know that they have car insurance will be less careful about
injuring their fetus. This is clearly not the case, even if it is the case for car
accidents in general, which is doubtful. The type of risk we are talking about
in this case is very different from the prototypical insurance risk, such as
theft or fire. As Baker and Simon show, the typical effect of insuring against a
risk is often to completely eliminate it from the day-to-day concern of people
who are exposed to it. Risks that are insured are experienced in a very different manner than those risks considered as beyond insurance. 22 1 This may be
true in the case of fire or theft where lost items are replaced but it is much
more complicated in the case of an injured child. The fact of the injury is
never altered through compensation; it is only the experience of coping, the
material realities of support in its aftermath, that is changed. And of course,
parents understand that "insurance compensation covers only the monetary
losses experienced by policyholders, and often only a portion of those'. 22 2
The loss itself is not compensable.
More importantly, there are the lingering effects of blame. The consequence of placing the focus on the woman to guard against "risks" is that the
location of blame for any adverse outcomes with respect to the pregnancy,
whether they can be conceived of as harms related to the "risks" or not, is
directly on the mother. In Landsman's 1998 study of mothers of children
with disabilities, all of the women indicated that they had either "struggled to
determine what they might have done wrong to bring about a disability or
felt that they were being wrongfully judged by others as having done some-
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thing improper".2 3 Further, the women's narratives demonstrated that reproduction is publicly represented, and often accepted, as subject to the individual control of the mother. A common theme in the stories of mothers with
disabled infants was the severe unfairness of feeling as though they had done
everything right, of having followed all of the experts' advice, and still having
suffered the trauma of dashed expectations. 224
That blame falls almost exclusively on individual mothers is true despite
the recognition that many of the "risks" associated with adverse outcomes in
pregnancy are objectively beyond individual women's control.225 After all, the
model essentially amounts to women taking responsibility not only for their
own actions, but for their "environments" as well. 226 In this sense, the state of
"perpetual anxiety" that characterizes pregnancy has much in common with
the experience of living with the risks of toxic chemical pollution. As Ruhl
states, "the things most feared... are mostly invisible until their effects are
[finally] manifested".22 7
What more is the mother expected to take responsibility for? As Ruhl
notes, "when the health of a fetus is discovered, prior to birth, to be 'compromised in some way', women are increasingly expected to assume responsibility for that, too", usually with a decision to terminate the pregnancy." In
this situation, what Duden calls the "interiorization of eugenics", women
shoulder the bulk of the guilt and the blame. Now, with the imposition of
liability, we further target women and make them the locus of responsibility
for the health of the child.
Further, pregnancy risks as we have conceptualized them, might differ
from more conventional insurance risks, "by dint of the fact that they obey
less a logic of compensation and capitalization and more an imperative of
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prevention and prevision' 2 29 But even the discourse of prevention and precaution perpetuates this "illusion" that by following the risk-based script it is
possible for women to "seize hold of the future".2 30 As Ruhl notes, one consequence of the informal means of risk governance on mothers is that it leads
to "a proliferation of guilt by assuming responsibility everywhere".' Instead
of relieving mothers of guilt and responsibility, the insurance scheme potentially exacerbates this effect. It "makes the woman complicit in any birth defect [sic] her child may possess",23 2 regardless of her degree of control over that
outcome. And furthermore, adopting the script as one's own and behaving
according to its edicts in no way assures a woman the "healthy baby" she desires.

VI. CONCLUSION: COMPLICATING THE POLITICS OF RISk
GOVERNANCE
This article explores the body of the pregnant woman as the object of regulation-both formal and informal-in the context of techniques of risk governance and the assignment ofblame and responsibility. The question ofhow
risk governance affects the apportionment of responsibility and the assignment of blame is an emerging priority in the socio-legal studies of risk.
Where the governmentality literature on risk tends to view the translation
from risk to blame as a technique of risk governance-a mechanism for "individualizing" risk-the case of Alberta's MaternalTortLiabilityAct reveals
that the situation can be considerably more complex. Because of the explicit
link to the mother's insurance coverage, the connection between the pregnant woman's risky behaviour, and her "blameworthiness" (and thus legal
liability), can in some respects be considered a "collectivist" response to risk.
That is, it serves to share or spread the financial burden of dealing with the
consequences of the risk materializing-the care of the injured childamong a "risk pool" instead of imposing it on the mother or the family of the
229
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child alone. Resisting the move to impose liability on the mother, as Canadian law has done in the context of insurance, would mean maintaining the
"individual" responsibility for the risk as per Dobson.
But liability and, consequently, blame, in this example, is determined according to the law of negligence. Tort law generally, and negligence law specifically, emerged to govern the field of accidental harms.233 In fact, the central doctrine of negligence, according to O'Malley, ensured that legal subjects
would bear the responsibility for any harm they inflicted carelessly on others.2 1 "[I]n a sense, torts legislated risk awareness".'2 3 But tort law eventually
developed into a form of "social insurance": that is, it sought to distribute loss
in a socially effective manner to those best able to bear the financial burden,
not necessarily those at fault.2 36 It became a mechanism for the collectivizing
of risk. The welfare state governed largely through these social insurance
technologies.
As explored, neo-liberalism is thought to be replacing these "social" risk
technologies "with complex techniques of risk management based on market
models, private insurance and increased individual responsibility for risk
management". ' The private insurance industry is becoming recognized as a
central social institution of risk distribution and moral regulation. 3 Thus,
while allowing maternal tort liability (as the Alberta legislation does) can be
considered a collectivizing move (because of the tie to the mothers' insurance
plan)-it should be noted that it remains essentially "privatizing." It is a "solution" that requires families to turn to litigation and to attempt to gain
compensation from a private insurance scheme, instead of imposing a social
and collective responsibility to care for children born with special needssuch as through universal, publicly-funded services. The risk is not fully collectivized, or shared by society as a whole, but is confined to a narrow risk
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pool, which in fact, may be circumscribed further as insurance companies
respond to the legislation.
The withdrawal of the state from "welfare state" initiatives of the type
that would deliver universal publicly-funded services to all children born
with special needs goes hand in hand with an appeal to personal responsibility and self-care, as well as the establishment of self-regulatory competencies
among individual and collective subjects. 239 Further, it must be stressed that
litigation necessarily relies on a fault-based model. The assignment of blame
to the mother comes with emotional and social consequences, notwithstanding the fact that it may be in her material best interests. As Balsamo
demonstrates, the female body is constantly being evaluated, even when not
pregnant. It is judged for its maternal "potential," and "evaluated in terms of
its physiological and moral status as a potential container for the embryo or
fetus".240 Pregnant women are judged by their peers and by themselves.
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